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Taxes, Market Structure9 and
1utrlaional Price Discr milmatio
Richard C. Henderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic taxes must be accounted for when goods are traded in
international markets. Without any adjustment, imported merchandise
would suffer taxes in both the countries of production and consumption.
To avoid double taxation, importing countries rebate or exempt taxes
imposed in the country of production, allowing imports to compete with
domestically produced goods. In essence, taxes are assessed only where
the merchandise is consumed. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT")' has adopted this tax adjustment mechanism to pre-
vent countries' internal fiscal decisions from harming their international
competitive positions. The mechanism thereby avoids competitive dis-
tortions in international trade.
GATT also governs dumping, which is price discrimination between
different national markets.2 Consequently, GATT employs the same tax
* Former Senior Analyst, International Trade Administration, Office of Compliance. Currently
attending the Amos Tuck Graduate School of Business at Dartmouth College. The views expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Department of
Commerce. The author would like to thank John D. McInerney, Senior Counsel in the Office of
Chief Counsel at ITA, and David Mueller, Division Director, Office of Antidumping Compliance,
for their assistance in developing the ideas in this Article.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
2 Most authorities generally agree that the theory of classical price discrimination provides the
framework for dumping. See, e.g., J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1966) [hereinafter VINER]. Viner states: "The one essential characteristic of dumping, I contend, is
price discrimination between purchasers in different national markets." Id. at 4. See also Ehrenhaft,
Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping
Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958) [hereinafter Ehrenhaft]; Hendrick, The United States An-
tidumping Act, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 914 (1964); Note, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust
Law?, 74 YALE L.J. 707 (1965). Although price discrimination provides the framework for dump-
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adjustment to prevent international price discrimination calculations
from distorting international trade patterns.'
Firms engage in price discrimination by charging unequal prices to
different buyers of goods of "like grade and quality."4 Margins measure
the extent of dumping by comparing the price of imported merchandise
with a foreign market value,5 which is based on the price of equivalent
merchandise in the home market or the country of exportation.'
Consumption taxes7 complicate international price-to-price calcula-
tions. Because countries generally impose different tax rates on a variety
ing, authors have noted that the theoretical "fit" is not perfect. Callman quotes Viner as stating that
"the Antidumping Act of 1921 has been described as a curious hybrid of traditional ideas and price
discrimination theories of the antitrust laws." R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 7.30 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter CALLMAN].
3 Article VI(1) of the GATT acknowledges the interrelationship between taxes and price com-
parability. "Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of sale,
for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability." GATT, supra
note 1, at art. VI, para. 1. GATT, therefore, requires that countries adjust the calculation of dump-
ing margins to account for the difference in tax rates between countries. In recognition of this tax
adjustment system, Article VI(4) of the GATT states: "[No product ... shall be subject to an-
tidumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes
borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation
." Id. at art. VI, para. 3.
These provisions allow for differences in taxation among countries and disallow the artificial
creation of antidumping margins from a simple comparison of tax-inclusive prices in the different
countries. Recognizing this, Article 2, paragraph 6, of the GATT Antidumping Code provides: "In
order to effect a fair comparison between the export price and the domestic price in the exporting
country [in calculating dumping margins] ... due allowance shall be made.., for the differences in
taxation between the two markets." Article 2(6) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1979. See also notes 25 and 26, supra.
4 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982); CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 71; see
also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 62-65 (1976). Price discrimination occurs when the ratio of price
to marginal cost is different between markets. If the cost of producing the merchandise is equal and
the variation in price is not due to differences in cost, the price is discriminatory. Essentially, price
discrimination recognizes that price depends on elasticity. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST 681 (1977) [hereinafter SULLIVAN]; W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
350-52 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter NICHOLSON].
5 Absolute margins measure the extent of dumping through a comparison of import price and
foreign market value ("FMV"). FMV is the U.S. term of art for home market (or surrogate third-
country) price; the European Community, in contrast, uses the term "normal value" for home-
market price. See, eg., C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 604-
11 (3d ed. 1987).
6 Margins require adjustments for differences between markets in terms of sale, such as quantity
discounts. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 104-06.
7 Consumption taxes can be defined as taxes that are eligible for border tax adjustments (see
discussion infra) and include: single-stage taxes (sales taxes); multi-stage non-cumulative taxes
('TVA); and multi-stage cumulative taxes (cascade taxes). The term "consumption tax" is preferable
to "indirect tax," which can include property taxes and some social security charges. ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND TAX
STRUCTURES IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 17 (1968) [hereinafter OECD BORDER TAX
ADJUSTMENTS].
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of tax bases, dumping margins must adjust for differences in national
taxation policies. The reason is apparent: since ultimate prices to con-
sumers may differ when tax rates are unequal, a simple price-to-price
comparison will generate a spurious dumping margin. The problem can
be separated into two components. First, tax rates differ between coun-
tries. When home-market and export-market tax rates differ, a direct
comparison of tax-inclusive (after-tax) prices will magnify or hide dump-
ing margins. Second, even if tax rates are the same, after-tax prices will
be different because dumping requires a difference in pre-tax prices be-
tween the two countries. Simple, unadjusted calculations made on an
after-tax price will bias antidumping calculations, creating or destroying
margins. Other countries, including until recently the United States, cal-
culate margins using a tax-exclusive (pre-tax) price.' Yet a pre-tax ap-
proach is not intuitive; price discrimination is based on prices paid by
consumers (not necessarily the ultimate consumer) and taxes are integral
to that price.
In enforcing the U.S. antidumping statute,9 the U.S. Department of
Commerce ("Commerce") underestimates price discrimination by for-
eign firms. This allows importers to undercut the prices charged by U.S.
manufacturers. The U.S. antidumping statute requires an after-tax mea-
surement of price discrimination between the export market and the
United States. Commerce's interpretation of the statute presumes the
existence of perfectly competitive markets, requiring the creation of an
artificial tax adjustment and the assumption of 100% pass-through of
taxes to consumers. Perfectly competitive markets are, however, incon-
sistent with the existence of price discrimination. Consequently, to rem-
edy dumping, Commerce must assume the existence of imperfectly
competitive markets, eliminate the tax adjustment, and disallow the sim-
ple assumption of 100% tax pass-through. This will increase the assess-
ment of antidumping duties on a large variety of imported products.
Commerce's current cost-based calculation methods cannot measure
tax pass-through. In one case, however, Commerce has employed a so-
phisticated econometric model of supply (cost) and demand elasticities to
estimate tax pass-through. Because econometric models can do more
than simply measure pass-through, the U.S. Government should adopt
an econometric approach in all antidumping cases. Econometric models
recognize the dependence of prices on market structure. These models
thereby allow the U.S. Government to segregate pricing behavior consis-
8 See, e.g., C. STANBROOK, DUMPING: A MANUAL ON THE EEC ANTIDUMPING LAW &
PRACTICE 24 (1980).
9 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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tent with different market structures from behavior that injures a bal-
anced set of U.S. interests, which includes producers, consumers, and
downstream industries.
II. TAXES AND THE U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW
Congress designed the tax adjustment clause in the U.S. antidump-
ing statute to adjust for differences in taxation between the United States
and other countries.10 To prevent taxes from creating dumping margins,
the U.S. statute requires that the amount of tax rebated or not collected
be added to the U.S. price of the exported merchandise." Congress
crafted the provision believing that the addition of taxes to the price of
imported merchandise would prevent export tax rebates or exemptions
from constituting dumping. The relevant section of the 1921 statute,
which remained in effect until 1974, required adding to the price of the
imported merchandise: "[T]he amount of any taxes [rebated or forgiven
on export and] imposed in the country of exportation upon the manufac-
turer, producer, or seller, in respect to the manufacture, production, or sale
of merchandise to the United States."12 The Trade Act of 1974 changed
the italicized words to read "directly upon the exported merchandise or
components thereof."13
With this change, Congress directed Commerce to focus on the ex-
port price-U.S. price ("USP")-rather than home-market price, as a
basis for taxing the exported merchandise.14 Until recently, the new
wording made no difference in calculating dumping margins. Commerce
continued to follow its traditional calculation method of stripping taxes
from the ultimate price of the home-market merchandise, which is re-
ferred to as "foreign market value" ("FMV"). Since the exported mer-
10 During the 1919 hearings, it was explained that: "The foreign excise tax levied on the article
for domestic use and not levied on the exported article, just as we do here, can have no possible
connection with unfair competition or dumping." See Hearings on H.R. 9983 and H.R. 10071
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1919).
11 The Senate Report on the legislation stated: "In order that ... any excise tax which is re-
funded or not collected upon the exportation of the merchandise shall not constitute dumping, it is
necessary to add such items to the purchase price [!a , U.S. price]." See S. RP. No. 16, 67th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 12 (1921).
12 Antidumping Act, ch. 14, § 203, 42 Stat. 11, 12 (1921), repealed by Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (1979) [emphasis added.].
13 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2048 (1974), repealed by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (1979) [emphasis added.].
14 In 1974, the Treasury Department had the responsibility for administering the antidumping
law. Currently, the Department of Commerce/International Trade Administration (Commerce) has
the authority to impose import duties on merchandise dumped into the United States. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (1982).
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chandise no longer carried its home-market tax burden, Commerce
calculated dumping margins-FMV less USP-based on pre-tax prices.
Figure 1 simulates Commerce's traditional method, assuming a
home-market price ("HMPrice") of $100, a home-market tax
("HMTax") rate of 10%, and an export price ("USP") of $90.1' By
stripping taxes out of its dumping calculations (i.e., -$10), Commerce
generated a pre-tax margin of $10.16
FIGURE 1
FMV USP
$ 100 (HMPrice w/o Tax)
+$ 10 (10% HMTax)
$ 110 (Price w/HMTax)
-$ 10 (10% HM Tax)
$ 100 $90
Margin =FMV-USP = $100- $90= $10
Commerce believes that the calculation in Figure 1-which ignores
the existence of taxes-implements Congress' intent that taxes should
not cause margins.
17
In 1986, the Court of International Trade ("CIT") overturned Com-
merce's practice, mandating the addition of taxes to U.S. price rather
than subtraction from foreign market value.18 Following the CIT's in-
structions precisely, Commerce applied the HMTax to USP, and thus
increased the margin from $10 in Figure 1 to $11 in Figure 2.19
15 Implicit in these examples are the harmless simplifying assumptions that U.S. price equals the
entered value of the merchandise and that the merchandise sold in the United States is exactly the
same as merchandise sold in the home market. In general, these assumptions will not hold.
16 Commerce usually starts with home-market prices that already include the home-market tax
(Price w/HMTax), strips out the home-market tax (10% HMTax), and ends up with FMV, which in
Figure 1 is $100.
17 The need to adjust for taxes is apparent. If, for example, an unadjusted after-tax calculation
had been made, the margin would increase by the amount of the tax forgiven on export to the United
States.
FMV USP
$ 100 (Price w/o Tax)
+$ 10 (10% Tax)
$ 110 (Price w/Tax) $ 90
Margin=FMV-USP=$1l0-$90=$20
18 Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). The CIT's
decision forced Commerce to use the method in Figure 2 to redetermine the administrative proceed-
ing on Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, from Japan, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,278 (Dep't
Comm. 1985) (final admin. review). See infra notes 54 & 63.
19 Commerce used the method in Figure 2 only in the Zenith redetermination. See supra note
18. The CIT was aware of the margin magnification problem, justifying it as permissible punishment
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+$ 10 (10% HMTax) +$ 9 (10% HMTax)
$ 110 $99
Margin=$110-$99=$11
In all of its following decisions, however, Commerce decided to
equalize the tax burden between the two markets, using a "circum-
stances-of-sale" ("C-O-S") adjustment.2 ° In Figure 3, the C-O-S adjust-
ment (-$1) is simply the difference between the tax burden in the United
States ($9) and the tax burden in the home market ($10).
FIGURE 3
FMV USP
$ 100 $ 90
+$ 10 (10% HMTax) +$ 9 (10% HMTax)
$ 110 (HMPrice w/HMTax) $ 99
-$ I C-o-S ($9-$10)
$ 109
Margin=$109-$99=$10
In effect, Commerce forced the after-tax margin in Figure 3 to con-
for dumping. Commerce is appealing the decision, based on the belief that Congress designed the
antidumping law to be remedial, not penal. See, eg., Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 608 F.
Supp. 653 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
20 Section 773(a)(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 gives Commerce the authority to
make a "circumstances-of-sale" ("C-O-S") adjustment.
In determining foreign market value, if it is established to the satisfaction of the administering
authority that the amount of any difference between the United States price and the foreign
market value.., is wholly due or partly due to... (B)... differences in circumstances of sale
... then due allowance shall be made therefore.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1982). The legislative history of the amendments to the Antidumping Act
of 1921 sheds little additional light on the meaning of the term "circumstances-of-sale." See Act of
August 14, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-630, 72 Stat. 583 (1958) (repealed 1979). The House and Senate
Reports give the following identical explanation of the provision:
Under the bill as reported, provision is made ... for consideration of "other differences in
circumstances of sale" in addition to quantity differentials. This is designed to facilitate efficient
and fair comparison between foreign market value and price to the United States market. Ex-
amples would be differences in terms of sale, credit terms, and advertising and selling costs.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 85TH CONG., IsT SEss., REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R.
6006, H.R. REP. No. 1261, at 7, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3498, 3503;
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 6006, S. REP.
No. 1619, at 7, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3498, 3503. Like the above
passage, Commerce regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of selling expenses which qualify for a
C-O-S adjustment. Commerce believes that the specific terms of the C-O-S provision are broad
enough to support a tax-differential adjustment. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1958).
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form to the pre-tax margin in Figure 1 of $10.21 To do this, Commerce
equalized the effective tax burden between the two markets instead of
simply equalizing the nominal 10% tax rate. In Figure 3, the tax burden
on the U.S. merchandise is $9, and the effective burden on the home
market merchandise is $10-$1, or $9.
Commerce's decision to match pre-tax and after-tax margins in Fig-
ure 3 provides two important insights. First, although a nominal 10%
home-market tax is applied to both markets, the effective tax rate on the
U.S. merchandise is 10%: a $9 burden imposed upon its $90 price. In
contrast, the effective tax rate applicable to the home market is 9%: a $9
tax burden imposed upon a $100 price.22 Second, for purposes of the tax
adjustment calculation, Commerce's method could be alternatively
viewed as effectively equalizing the tax base-or price-in both markets.
If both foreign market value and U.S. price equal $90, then the applica-
tion of a 10% tax rate produces equal tax burdens of $9 in each market.
The confusion over nominal tax rates, tax burdens, and prices re-
sults from the ambiguous and imprecise language of the U.S. antidump-
ing statute's tax clause. The clause states that the addition of taxes to
U.S. price shall equal the amount of home-market taxes which have been
forgiven "by reason of export."'2 3 The question is whether the appropri-
ate "U.S. price" is the price of merchandise sold in the home market, in
the United States, or, perhaps, somewhere between the two prices.24 The
21 In its final determination, Commerce stated that it made the C-O-S adjustment "[t]o avoid
artificially inflating or deflating margins ...." Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color,
from Japan, 53 Fed. Reg. 4051 (Dept Comm. 1988) (final admin. review) [hereinafter Television
Receiving Sets, from Japan]. Zenith is currently challenging this adjustment in the CIT. Zenith
Elecs. Corp. v. United States, No. 88-2-00122 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed 1988).
22 Commerce's calculation in Figure 3 results in an overrebate of taxes on exported merchandise.
In other words, exported goods qualify for a 10% rebate, while domestically consumed goods suffer
only a 9% tax rate. Commerce considers overrebates of indirect taxes on exported goods to be a
countervailable export subsidy under the U.S. countervailing duty statute. Tariff Act of 1930 § 771,
Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1982)). See also
infra note 31.
23 The statute states:
The purchase price and exporter's sale price shall be adjusted by being-
(1) increased by ...
(C) the amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation directly upon the exported
merchandise or components thereof, which have been rebated, or which have not been col-
lected, by reason of the exportation of the merchandise to the United States, but only to the
extent that such taxes are added to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise when
sold in the country of exportation ....
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1) (1982).
24 Import valuation has caused recurring problems for international trade officials. Originally,
the problem centered on customs valuation difficulties, particularly regarding customs duties. Viner
discusses the origin of this problem in some detail and states:
As a matter of fact, however, few tariff laws provide for the assessment of duties on the basis of
the export price of foreign commodities, especially if the export price is lower than the foreign
250
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rewording of the antidumping statute in 1974 seems to direct Commerce
to focus on U.S. price, rather than home-market price, as a basis for
taxation. Commerce believed, however, that an adjustment for unequal
tax burdens was necessary for margins to adhere to Congressional intent
that taxes should not cause margins. Equally significant, Commerce pre-
sumed that its C-O-S tax adjustment would meet the U.S. Government's
obligations under GATT. Fortunately, GATT-unlike the U.S. stat-
ute-provides certain theoretical tools to help understand the problems
created by different domestic tax systems.25
III. THE GATT BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM
As shown above, countries adopted a simple system of rebating the
home-market tax on export to combat double taxation. Merchandise
sold in the home market carried a tax burden determined by the home-
market tax rate, while merchandise sold for export carried a tax burden
based on the tax rate of the importing country. It is unclear whether the
drafters of GATT, the GATT Antidumping Code,26 and the U.S. an-
tidumping law fully understood the principles underlying the tax rebate
system. Despite dissimilar treatment of the issue, both GATT and U.S.
law have clearly adopted this rebate system to deal with taxes in interna-
tional trade.27 Various GATT provisions support this contention.28 For
market value. In most countries which make use of ad valorem duties they are levied in theory
at least on the foreign market value, or else on an officially determined value which is more or
less independent of the export price.
VINER, supra note 2, at 156. This is no longer the case because international appraisement rules now
rely on export price. Viner also mentions the importance of determining accurate values of U.S.
price and FMV for normal Customs purposes and in calculating dumping margins. Id. at 265-67.
The problems associated with unequal tax bases--ie., unequal prices--were also explored by the
OECD in its study of border tax adjustments and were determined to be of "minor importance."
OECD BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, supra note 7, at 57-58 (1968).
25 An appeal to GATT is the appropriate recourse for the statute's lack of clarity because:
"Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as to not conflict with interna-
tional law or with an international agreement of the United States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1986).
26 Agreement No. 103 in App. C; GATT Doc. L/2812 (1967).
27 "It is interesting to note at the outset that most of the GATT provisions on border tax adjust-
ments appear to be based on proposals drafted by the United States, reflecting United States practice
in its bilateral agreements." Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustments: Problems and Proposals, 2 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 92 (1970) [hereinafter Rosendahl]. With respect to the tax rebate system:
"There was general agreement that the main provisions of the GATT represented the codification of
practices which existed at the time the provisions were drafted, re-examined and completed." Re-
port of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970, Border Tax Adjustments, GAIT Doc. L/
3464, reprinted in THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 97, 99 (18th Supp. 1972) [hereinafter
WORKING PARTY REPORT]. "The traditional concepts regarding subsidies, border tax adjustments,
and countervailing duties are embodied in the GATT." Feller, Mutiny Against Bounty: An Exami-
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example, Article III ensures that imported goods do not bear a greater
tax than domestic goods, providing that: "The products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other con-
tracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products .... 29
Article XVI, which deals with export subsidies, explicitly allows a
rebate or forgiveness of consumption taxes.30 For subsidies, if exports
entered the importing country already carrying one consumption tax, the
equal application of the importing country's consumption tax would
force the imported good to incur two tax burdens.31 Permitting the for-
giveness or rebate of consumption taxes on export thus prevents taxes
from distorting international trade.
To ensure that merchandise traded across international borders
neither escapes taxes entirely nor suffers double taxes, GATT employs
the country-of-origin principle and the destination principle. 32  The
nation of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 17, 54 (1969) [hereinafter Feller]. See also OECD BORDER TAX ADJuST-
MENTS, supra note 7.
28 There is no unified GATT provision dealing exclusively with border taxes; the GATT rules
in this area are scattered through several articles of the Agreement as well as interpretive notes
and working party reports. Excluding article VI (antidumping and countervailing duties)...
the principle GATT articles dealing with border tax adjustments are articles II (tariff conces-
sions), III (internal taxation of imports), and XVI (subsidies).
Rosendahl, supra note 27, at 92-93. See also supra note 25.
29 Article III of GATT . . . reflects a desire to equalize domestic tax treatment on goods
consumed domestically, whether domestically produced or imported, and a desire to relieve
other goods (exports) of that burden.... This problem has two sides, however: the imposition
of an equalizing tax on imported goods, on the one hand, and the revision or exemption from
domestic taxes for exported goods, on the other hand.
J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 295 (1969) [hereinafter J. JACKSON].
30 Article XVI states: "The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the
like product when destined for domestic consumption ... shall not be deemed to be a subsidy."
GATT, supra note 1.
31 The report of the 1960 GATT Working Party On Subsidies, which was adopted by the con-
tracting parties, listed as a subsidy: "The exemption, in respect of exported goods of... taxes... if
amounts exceeding those effectively levied ... in the form of indirect taxes.., in connection with
importation ...." Note 22, supra, demonstrates that Commerce grants exports a 1% overrebate of
indirect taxes. Commerce's creation of an export subsidy in its antidumping margin calculation
violates the integrity of U.S. import relief laws. Until recently, most countries had one law covering
both countervailing duties and antidumping duties; logically, the countervailing duty and antidump-
ing statutes should fit together precisely, without overlap. Dumping calculations, such as Figure 3,
should not create countervailing subsidies. See Rosendahl, supra note 27; Feller, supra note 27 (for a
discussion of the interrelationship between the two statutes).
32 See OECD BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, supra note 7; WORKING PARTY REPORT, supra
note 27; Latimer, The Border Tax Adjustment Question, CANADIAN TAX J., 409-413 [hereinafter
Latimer]; Rosendahl, supra note 27, at 85-146; Feller, supra note 27, at 17-176. Under an interna-
tional regime of homogeneous tax rates, the origin and destination principles are the same. Neu-
mark Report, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3201 (1982).
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country-of-origin principle applies to direct taxes (i.e., taxes on profits),
such as the corporate income tax. The origin principle requires taxation
at the point of production, making it unnecessary to compensate for the
distinctive tax structure of each country. GATT assumes that direct
taxes fully shift backward onto the producer. Because the producer ab-
sorbs the tax, no rebate is necessary at the time of export. Conversely,
the destination principle applies to consumption taxes (i.e., taxes on
products), such as a sales tax. Consumption taxes shift the burden for-
ward to the consumer, as merchandise is taxed at the point of consump-
tion.33 Since indirect taxes are fully shifted (100% pass-through) into the
price paid by the consumer, the consumer pays the tax, and consumption
taxes qualify for rebate on export.34
Border tax adjustments "refer to the international treatment of taxes
under the rules of... (GATT)," 5 and are defined as those adjustments
required to make the destination principle function.36 Although GATT
never specifically refers to border tax adjustments or its underlying basic
"tax shifting" theory, the border tax adjustment mechanism is undoubt-
edly GATT's method of handling taxes.3 7 As long as consumption taxes
are shifted forward into price, "GATT border tax adjustments prevent
distortion of prices regardless of the rate of indirect taxation [i.e., con-
sumption taxes]."'3'  The GATT border tax adjustment mechanism there-
fore ensures fiscal sovereignty and "trade neutrality" 39 between
33 The distinction between direct taxes and consumption (indirect) taxes has been debated since
the early 1960s. Several countries, in particular the United States, have argued that the distinction is
arbitrary and should be re-evaluated. Although the debate centered on technical, economic argu-
ments, the debate was truly a political one, brought on by U.S. balance of payments problems, the
existence of fixed exchange rates (disallowing exchange rate adjustments for the balance of payments
deficit), and the European Communities' replacement of various indirect tax systems with a value-
added system. The heart of the problem was U.S. reliance on direct taxes-which are not eligible for
rebate-and the European Communities' use of consumption taxes-which are eligible for rebate.
This Article does not revisit this debate and, at least initially, accepts the artificial distinction be-
tween direct taxes and consumption taxes. See WORKING PARTY REPORT, supra note 27; OECD
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS, supra note 7; Feller, supra note 27; Latimer, supra note 32, at 409-13;
Petty, Border Tax Adjustments and GATT 379-89 (Tariffs and Trade, Twenty-First Tax Confer-
ence, 1968) [hereinafter Petty]; Rosendahl, supra note 27.
34 See supra note 31.
35 Leontiades, The Logic Of Border Taxes, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 173 (1966) [hereinafter Leontiades].
36 WORKING PARTY REPORT, supra note 27, at 97-98.
37 "[The border tax adjustment] is a problem almost entirely generated by GATT provi-
sions .... J. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 294. For further reading on the relationship between tax
shifting and the border tax adjustment mechanism, see Feller, supra note 27, at 17-76; Latimer, supra
note 32, at 409-13; Leontiades, supra note 35, at 175; Petty, supra note 33, at 379-89; Rosendahl,
supra note 27, at 85-146.
38 Leontiades, supra note 35, at 174.
39 "[The members of the tax working party] were also of the opinion that the present rules
served the purpose of trade neutrality of [border] tax adjustment .. " WORKING PARTY REPORT,
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countries, preventing one country's tax system from providing it a "com-
petitive edge" over another.40
The border tax adjustment mechanism levels effective tax rates, al-
lowing both imported and domestically produced goods to compete on
equal terms.41 The mechanism makes no particular assumption of pass-
through, price or tax burden. To calculate margins, Commerce used the
border tax adjustment mechanism to equalize nominal tax rates. Com-
merce then employed the C-O-S adjustment to equalize tax burdens be-
tween the two markets, generating unequal effective tax rates. The
creation of unequal tax rates violates the border tax adjustment mecha-
nism's fundamental principle of tax rate equalization. Attempting to
eliminate the influence of taxes on price and, consequently, price discrim-
ination, Commerce undercut the mechanism used to compensate for do-
mestic taxation in international trade. As shown below, Commerce's
belief in tax burden equalization is derived from the GATT philosophy
of comparative advantage, which is inconsistent with the conditions nec-
essary for the existence of price discrimination.
IV. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The guiding philosophy of GATT is the belief that free trade is the
best policy.42 To implement this philosophy, GATT relies on the theory
of comparative advantage,4 3 which requires that "countries... specialize
in producing goods of which they are relatively more efficient produ-
supra note 27, at 97, 99. "Trade neutrality" is a shorthand expression for unbiased international
trade flows. See, Feller, supra note 27, at 17-76; Latimer, supra note 32, at 409-13; Leontiades, supra
note 35, at 175; Rosendahl, supra note 27, at 85-146.
40 "[The border tax adjustment] touches the core of a major question of international trade
policy today-i.e., to what degree should international regulation of trade require participating na-
tions to conform their domestic, social, economic, and political institutions and policies." J. JACK-
SON, supra note 29, at 295. There has also been substantial debate on whether the assumptions
underpinning consumption and direct taxes and border tax adjustments are trade neutral with re-
spect to balance of payments problems and exchange rate flexibility. See, eg., Johnson & Krause,
Border Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, Comparative Advantage, and the Balance of Payments, 3
CANADIAN J. ECON. 595, 595-602 (1970); Mumey, Trade Tax Symmetry, 3 CANADIAN J. ECON. 80
(1970); OECD, Working Party No. 4 of the Council on Border Tax Adjustments, OECD Doc. C/
WP4(66(4)) (Feb. 16, 1966) [hereinafter Working Party No. 4].
41 The border tax adjustment mechanism equalizes tax rates, which can be either home-market
or export-market tax rates.
42 NICHOLSON, supra note 4, at 563 n.3.
43 "GATT usually presumes that trading enterprises will act on commercial considerations and
that the economic theories of comparative advantage will lead these enterprises to extend their inter-
national trade in order to reap its benefits ...." J. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 330. The advantages
of free and fair international trade are discussed in G. HABERLER, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE THEORY 52-58 (1961).
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cers." Free and fair trade under GATT therefore requires production
efficiency; for production to be efficient, perfect competition must be as-
sumed.45 Perfectly competitive price systems46 efficiently allocate re-
sources, forcing each good to trade at the same price regardless of who
buys or sells it.47 As demonstrated below, perfect competition requires
100% tax pass-through and homogeneous prices. Imperfectly competi-
tive markets, on the other hand, disallow such simple assumptions.48
A. Perfect Competition
Under the model of perfect competition, each firm is a price-taker
with no control over prices, profits in the long-run are zero, and no in-
centives encourage one to enter or leave the market.4 9 Firms selling in a
competitive market will face a price equal to the revenue acquired on the
last unit sold-marginal revenue. Because profits are zero, both price
and marginal revenue will equal the cost to produce the last unit sold-
marginal cost. To maximize profits, each firm will produce so long as
marginal revenue, or price, is equal to marginal cost.50
If a consumption tax is imposed, firms in a perfectly competitive
market will always pass through 100% of the tax to the consumer. Fig-
ure 4 shows the standard conditions for perfect competition. The mar-
ket's supply curve is fiat, and the demand curve-faced by the entire
market-slopes down and to the right.51 The imposition of a unit tax
pushes the supply curve up by the amount of the tax (t); S shifts to S',
44 NICHOLSON, supra note 4, at 531. For an in-depth treatment of comparative advantage, see
D. RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817 & J.M. Dent & Son
reprint 1965).
45 NICHOLSON, supra note 4, at 531-37.
46 Perfectly competitive markets are, of course, an economic abstraction. Few, if any, markets
could be classified as perfectly competitive.
47 Intuitively, perfectly competitive markets transmit accurate cost information by eliminating
deviations between prices and costs. Because the price system quickly transmits accurate informa-
tion, efficiency is ensured and resources are allocated optimally among producers.
48 See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 268-74
[hereinafter MUSGRAVE]; J. Perloff, The Bias from Inappropriately Using Competitive Models to
Estimate Tax Incidence in Dumping Cases (Dec. 1986) (unpublished manuscript; available at the
Dept. of Commerce Public Reading Room B-099 in the antidumping proceeding Television Receiv-
ing Sets, from Japan, supra note 20) [hereinafter Perloff].
49 This is based on an economist's definition of profits.
These profits represent a return to the owner of a business in excess of that which is strictly
necessary to keep him in the business. Hence, when we talk about a firm earning "zero" profits,
we mean that there is no entrepreneurial income being earned in excess of that which could be
earned on alternative investments.
NICHOLSON, supra note 4, at 326 n.2.
50 Id. at 261-79.
51 These conditions hold for a long-term analysis of perfectly competitive markets. Id. at 325-
40.
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quantity drops, and price increases by the amount of the tax (that is, t
P2 - PI). 2 Because price increases by the amount of the tax burden, the
consumer pays the entire tax. In other words, perfectly competitive mar-
kets assure 100% tax pass-through and homogeneous prices. 3 Under
the GATT condition of perfect competition, the border tax adjustment
mechanism assumes 100% pass-through, equal effective tax rates, and
homogeneous prices. The application of equal tax rates to equal prices
52 The results are applicable to an ad valorem tax as well, but the derivation is more difficult.
See MUSGRAVE, supra note 48, at 268-74, 474.
53 See supra note 33. The second aspect of the debate on border tax adjustments was the extent
to which the actual supply and demand curves deviated from those under perfect competition. The
existence of perfectly competitive markets was not formally attacked. Ultimately, the debate ground
to a halt, primarily because of the simplicity of the assumption of 100% pass-through. Although it
was never explicitly stated, the assumption rests on the intuitive appeal of the theory of comparative
advantage. In a sense, the countries arguing against 100% pass-through had to prove the negative-
Le., that 100% pass-through was not taking place. In addition, they would then have to specify the
proportion. See Working Party No. 4, supra note 40; WORKING PARTY REPORT, supra note 27, at
97-109. Dr. Crandall takes this approach in explaining how 100% pass-through can be assumed
using a general economic analysis. Crandall, The Effect of the Japanese Commodity Tax on the
Price of Television Receivers in Japan (submitted on Behalf of Respondents Oct. 1, 1986) (available
at the Dept. of Commerce Public Reading Room B-099 in the antidumping proceeding Television
Receiving Sets, from Japan, supra note 21). See also supra note 18; infra notes 54 and 63.
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generates equal tax burdens in both markets. This is the result Com-
merce attempted to achieve in Figure 3.
B. Imperfect Competition
Comparative advantage does not hold in imperfectly competitive
markets dominated by monopolies and oligopolies.5 4 Because market
power allows monopolies to command higher prices and produce lower
quantities than competitive firms, imperfect competition impedes alloca-
tive efficiency. As shown below, homogeneous prices and 100% pass-
through cannot be assumed.55
Like firms in perfect competition, a monopolist will set marginal
revenue equal to marginal cost in order to maximize profits. In contrast
to firms in a competitive market, however, a monopolist is not a price-
taker; it instead sets the price in the market, facing a market demand
curve that slopes down and to the right. Price will generally be above the
point where marginal revenue meets marginal cost.
Unlike firms in a perfectly competitive market, a monopolist does
not face a fiat supply curve; rather, the supply curve is the point where
the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves intersect. In Figure 5, a
tax (x) is imposed on a monopolist. The marginal cost curve (MC) shifts
up to MC'; quantity produced (at MR = MC') drops from Q, to Q2; and
price increases from P to P2. Therefore, the tax burden is less than the
54 Oligopolistic behavior, which is usually characterized by several large firms in one market, is
not amenable to a general theoretical framework. Therefore, price discrimination and dumping the-
ory have usually been couched in an analysis of monopolistic behavior. Imperfect competition is
generally oligopolistic, not monopolistic, in nature. True monopolies are rare. NICHOLSON, supra
note 4, at 283-345. Over the last several years, the theories of monopolistic behavior, price discrimi-
nation, and predatory pricing have become more refined and may call into question some assump-
tions used in this Article; this Article, however, will continue to use classical assumptions concerning
monopolies. See, eg., I. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1979) [hereinafter BORK]; Perloff,
supra note 48. This author and others in the court-ordered remand on Japanese television receivers
explained a relatively straight-forward treatment of a conjectural variations theory, which Com-
merce used to model the interaction between oligopolistic firms.
The conjectural variations theory tries to explain why firms change the amount they produce.
For example, as Firm X increases or decreases output, its revenue (p * q) will change. In a non-
competitive market such as an oligopoly, the other firms in the market will react to Firm X's
change in output by increasing or decreasing their output and, accordingly, their revenue. Con-
jectural variations theory states that this behavioral reaction by the rest of the firms in the
market was anticipated and, to a certain extent, incorporated into Firm X's original decision to
change its output. In other words, oligopolists vary their behavior to account for their conjec-
tures about the behavior of other suppliers.
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States (on file with the Federal Court, Nos. 88-1259 and 88-1260, 26).
See also supra notes 18 and 53; infra note 63.
55 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 48, at 268-74; Perloff, supra note 48; Davidson & Martin, General
Equilibrium Tax Incidence under Imperfect Competition: A Quantity-setting Supergame Analysis, 93
J. POL. ECON. 1212, 1212-23 (1985).
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increase in price (t < P1 - P2). In general, for a monopolist to continue
to maximize profits, it must pass through less than 100% of the tax
burden.5
6
The market power of a monopolist may also allow it to set unequal
prices in different markets. If markets are separated and the demand
curves in each market are different, a monopolist can increase profits
through price discrimination. Since the demand and marginal revenue
curves are different, prices in each market will also be different. Dump-
ing is simply an extension of price discrimination to the international
market, imposing the condition that the price charged in the home mar-
ket must be greater than the price in the export market.
Imperfectly competitive markets are consistent with dumping and
the existence of unequal prices in different markets. In contrast, the
blanket GATT assumptions of 100% pass-through, homogeneous prices,
and equal tax burdens are inconsistent with the existence of dumping.
By using the C-O-S adjustment (Figure 3), Commerce incorporated the
GATT assumptions consistent with the conditions associated with per-
fectly competitive markets, but inconsistent with the existence of dump-
ing. Commerce effectively eliminated a portion of the price
discriminatory behavior that it was trying to measure.
56 A more refined analysis can demonstrate the possibility of pass-through exceeding 100%. See
B. Wright, Notes on the Effects of a Commodity Tax on Prices and Profits in a Conjectural Varia-
tions Model in a Closed Economy (Mar. 1987) (California Agricultural Experiment Station, Gian-
nini Foundation of Agricultural Economics).
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V. CONCLUSION
The assumption of 100% tax pass-through and homogeneous prices
derive from the GATT philosophy that comparative advantage generates
free and fair international trade. These two assumptions, used in con-
junction with the border tax adjustment mechanism (which equalizes tax
rates between two countries), help prevent distortions in international
trade flows. This allows domestic and imported products to compete on
equal terms. Commerce's original practice of subtracting consumption
taxes from home-market price resulted in tax-free dumping margins.
Once forced to include taxes in price, Commerce preserved the tax-free
result by equalizing tax burdens. By equalizing the burdens, however,
Commerce used different effective tax rates in each market, undercutting
the foundation of the border tax adjustment mechanism. The dilemma
between tax-rate and tax-burden equalization reveals the conflict between
the theories of comparative advantage and dumping or international
price discrimination.
Comparative advantage presumes perfect competition, requiring ho-
mogeneous pricing across markets and 100% pass-through of consump-
tion taxes to consumers. Dumping presumes imperfect competition,
implying neither homogeneous pricing nor 100% pass-through. By in-
corporating the antidumping code in its framework, GATT was also
forced to assimilate certain assumptions consistent with imperfectly com-
petitive markets. This is a fundamental conflict. Dumping, which is pos-
sible only in imperfectly competitive markets, conflicts with the basic
GATT principle of comparative advantage.5 7
GATT incorporated the antidumping code in its framework in an
attempt to ensure that dumping margins generate trade-neutral results.
If used correctly in imperfectly competitive markets, the border tax ad-
justment mechanism will prevent biased dumping margins, restoring
trade patterns to those that would have existed in the absence of dump-
ing. Trade-neutral margins will neutralize dumping-no more, no less.
They are consistent with the premise that antidumping duties are reme-
dial rather than punitive. The appropriate amount of remedy for dump-
ing, however, depends directly on the amount of tax pass-through and
the degree to which price discrimination is practiced. Commerce erred
in its appeal to GATT principles of comparative advantage to justify the
57 In his discussion of GAIT provisions on state monopolies, Jackson states: "As might be ex-
pected for subject matter involving a type of economic behavior that does not fit very well into the
basic economic assumptions of trade and market activity that motivated most of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, state trading [monopolies] is a complex subject .. " J. JACKSON, supra
note 29, at 336.
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equalization of tax burdens between markets. Comparative advantage
assumes 100% pass-through and eliminates price differences between
markets. Commerce's tax adjustment calculation forced the dumping
margin to conform to a market condition that precludes the existence of
dumping.
The conflict between tax-burden and tax-rate equalization in dump-
ing calculations cannot be resolved by an appeal to GATT principles.5 8
Because comparative advantage conflicts with the theory of imperfect
competition, the tax-burden/tax-rate problem must be resolved by the
dumping law, which implicitly references the theoretical framework of
imperfect competition. For taxes, imperfect competition has three ef-
fects: it requires pass-through measurements, it mandates different tax
bases, and it generates unequal tax burdens.59 More importantly, it pre-
cludes ad hoc adjustments, such as Commerce's C-O-S adjustment, to
eliminate differences in tax burdens. Commerce's present method there-
fore understates dumping margins. Consequently, to properly remedy
dumping, Commerce must measure pass-through and apply the home-
market tax rate to both markets without adjustment.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Commerce confronts tax issues in several cases and, therefore, needs
to decide whether to retain the C-O-S tax adjustment and measure pass-
through using econometric models.6" To remedy dumping, Commerce
58 This analysis also resolves a long-simmering debate over whether the U.S. dumping law is a
price discrimination statute or a profit discrimination statute. Implicitly, Commerce maintains that
there is no difference and therefore describes dumping margins as measurements of rates of return to
producers, or profit discrimination. The Study of Antidumping Adjustment Methodology Recom-
mendation for Statutory Change (available at the Dept. of Commerce, Room B-099) [hereinafter
Antidumping Adjustment Methodology]. Bork also makes this argument, stating that returns must
be compared in order to measure price discrimination. BORK, supra note 54, at 399. See also infra
note 68.
Profit discrimination calculations, such as Figure 3, ignore what every savvy businessman
knows: dropping pre-tax price by $10 undercuts a competitor by $11. Simply put, taxes affect price,
driving an additional $1 tax wedge into the market. Moreover, if 100% pass-through cannot be
assumed, then price discrimination and profit discrimination are not the same thing. For more gen-
eral reasons, Viner also came to the same conclusion: "The relations of particular dumping prices to
costs of production, to dumper's profits, and to the prices of rival sellers, are often intricate problems
which cannot be solved by mere definition, and which in many cases are not susceptible of exact
solution." VINER, supra note 2, at 3-4. Viner also discusses tax rebate effects on dumping, id. at 14-
15, and countervailing duties. Id. at 174-77.
59 One could argue that pass-through measurements of consumption taxes necessitate "pass-
back" measurements of direct taxes.
60 In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, Commerce argued that the statute did not require
measurement of pass-through. The appeals court, however, ruled that there was no basis for dispute
because Commerce's econometric model showed 100% pass-through. 875 F.2d 291 (Fed. Cir.
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must drop the C-O-S adjustment and measure pass-through; as a result,
antidumping margins will increase in almost every Commerce antidump-
ing case." Either change will have substantial repercussions for foreign
producers, importers, and, eventually, consumers in the United States.
In addition, across-the-board increases in margins would likely generate
substantial opposition from trading partners of the United States.
There are no grounds, except historical precedent, for Commerce to
continue applying a C-O-S adjustment for taxes. Just as important, all
antidumping calculations should be made on an after-tax basis. At pres-
ent, Commerce factors taxes into antidumping cases that have viable
home-market sales. When home-market sales are insufficient to form a
basis for foreign market value, Commerce uses constructed value and
third-country surrogates, calculating margins on a pre-tax basis.6 2 Be-
cause Commerce does not include taxes in these cases, it would also have
to incorporate taxes-without a C-O-S adjustment-in calculations
based on third-country sales or constructed value.
It is uncertain whether the antidumping statute requires measure-
ment of pass-through. Commerce argues that the language of the tax
clause is ambiguous and subject to several interpretations.6" Leaving
1989). See also infra note 63. In a separate case, Commerce recently agreed to conduct an
econometric one-year extension. Daewoo EIecs. Co. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 931 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989). Commerce's use of the C-O-S adjustment is also a major issue in the antidumping case
on Paver Parts from Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Panel Article 1904, Panel U.S.A-89-1904-3;
and in litigation covering a recent administrative review of the Japanese television case, Zenith Elec-
tronics Corp. v. United States, No. 88-02-00122 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed 1988).
61 In mid-1989, Commerce was enforcing approximately 175 antidumping cases. Most of the
cases cover manufactured merchandise-such as television sets, brass sheet and strip, tapered roller
bearings, and cellular mobile telephones-and many of the cases involve significant import value.
For example, over $250,000,000 of imports are involved in a one-year administrative review of the
Brazilian frozen concentrated orange juice case. Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil
(submissions from respondents in the 1987-1988 administrative review) (available at the Dept. of
Commerce Public Reading Room, B099).
62 A discussion of Commerce's current policy on third-country and constructed value as a surro-
gate for FMV is outlined in Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Continuing Legal Education Div., Com-
prehensive Issue Review Under the Antidumping Duty Laws and Countervailing Duty Laws:
Commerce, The ITC, The Courts (June 1988) [hereinafter Comprehensive Issue Review] and 3 J.
PATTISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS § 5.05 (1987) [hereinafter
PATrISON].
63 Specifically, the tax clause states that U.S. price should be increased by the amount of any
taxes rebated or exempted on export "but only to the extent that such taxes are added to or included
in the price of such or similar merchandise when sold in the country of exportation." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1989). Commerce has not interpreted the clause in a consistent manner. In sev-
eral administrative proceedings during the mid-1980s, Commerce stated that:
The differing treatment of direct vs. indirect taxes under GATT and U.S. law arose from the
assumptions that indirect taxes were shifted fully forward to purchasers while direct taxes were
absorbed by sellers. By the late 1960's, however, academic literature and U.S. government re-
ports cast substantial doubt on the veracity of these assumptions. It is clear that the Congress
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aside statutory interpretation, administrative convenience may dictate a
blanket assumption of pass-through. Commerce's only attempt at mea-
suring pass-through was expensive, time-consuming, and required a pro-
fessional econometrician.4
in 1974 was aware of these doubts. In light of the public debate, it is only reasonable to con-
clude that the Congress, in its addition to section 772(d)(1)(C) of the "but only to the extent"
language, intended that we measure absorption and limit the addition of the tax passed through.
Commerce, however, went on to say that such measurements were impossible. Antidumping: Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Color Television Receivers from Korea, 49 Fed.
Reg. 7620, 7624 (Dep't Comm. 1984); Antidumping: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value; Color Television Receivers From Taiwan, 49 Fed. Reg. 7628, 7632 (Dep't Comm. 1984);
Color Television Receivers From Korea; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping
Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 50420, 50421 (Dep't Comm. 1984). See also Brief for Zenith Electronics Corp.,
Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, No. 88-1259-1260 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 1988).
Commerce now argues that the language of the tax clause could be interpreted in several ways,
including Commerce's cost-based interpretation. Moreover, Commerce argues that a cost-based in-
terpretation is consistent with: previous court decisions, such as Smith-Corona Group v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984); other statutory provisions,
such as the constructed value provisions (see supra note 60); and the general intent of GATT. Most
important, Commerce contends that measuring pass-through would not only "artificially create and
increase dumping margins," but also "impose upon Commerce a task far more burdensome and
complex than anything envisioned by Congress." Appellant's Reply Brief, Zenith Elecs. Corp. v.
United States, No. 88-1259-1260 (Fed. Cir. July 5, 1988).
64 Despite severe data limitations, the econometric model employed by Commerce in the court
redetermination of the Japanese television case supported 100% pass-through for one firm and indi-
cated greater than 100% pass-through for another. These results were generated for manufacturers
of television sets sold in Japan. It is unlikely that these results will be generally applicable to the
wide range of products and countries that Commerce covers in its administration of the antidumping
law.
In the redetermination, this author and others explained the econometric approach in an at-
tempt to convince the court that the difficulties in using econometrics to measure tax pass-through
were overwhelming: "Econometrics attempts to produce quantitative measurements of market forces
such as supply and demand, which economics deals with in a more qualitative way... Econometrics
is an interpretive process of analyzing theories, selecting assumptions, building models, running re-
gressions, critiquing results, and then repeating the process over and over again."
Although the model was general in design, its purpose was to measure only the tax incidence on
the consumer. Specifically, "Dr. Perloff's [the professional econometrician] econometric study
sought to calculate the amount of commodity tax which the Japanese manufacturers passed through
to their domestic customers by measuring the relative reactions of the manufacturers' costs and the
demand for televisions in Japan to the imposition of the tax." The model relied on the theories of
profit maximization (see supra note 50) and conjectural variations (see supra note 54). The difficul-
ties and complexities of the econometric approach were also highlighted:
Dr. Perloff's theory and restrictive assumptions increased the complexity of the pass-through
model in comparison to the standard.., method of analyzing firm and consumer behavior. Dr.
Perloff required increasingly complex specifications and regression techniques because simple
theories, models, and techniques would have yielded inaccurate estimations of the tax incidence.
However, sophisticated regression techniques (such as the three-stage-least-squares technique
used in this case) are extremely sensitive to misspecifications of the model. A better specified
dynamic model would better explain the effects of long-term changes in the market, such as cost
reductions due to technological change. As Dr. Perloff stated ". . . using a static model is
certainly inappropriate." However, dynamic models are exceptionally complex and demanding,
in the sense of both econometric expertise and data requirements.
Ultimately, in an attempt to convince the court that econometrics was inconsistent with the intent of
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An administrative convenience argument would likely focus on the
extreme disparity in the treatment of taxes, which require a complex
econometric model, as compared to other adjustments, such as discounts
and commissions, which Commerce normally adjusts by deducting or
equalizing costs in both markets.65 Commerce's best argument is that
econometrics is too complex to adopt for just one adjustment.66 A dual-
track treatment of taxes-using econometrics-and all other adjust-
ments-using cost-would undermine Commerce's ability to administer
the antidumping law effectively.
Taxes, however, create a nearly intractable problem for Commerce.
Many factors oppose an easy cost-based solution of 100% pass-through.
These factors include: the strong theoretical arguments against 100%
pass-through, the relatively explicit wording of the tax clause and Com-
merce's inconsistent treatment of that clause, the economic and political
scrutiny given international tax issues in the past, the current U.S. trade
deficit, the number of U.S. industries receiving relief under the antidump-
ing statute, and Commerce's precedent-setting econometric study-and
its plan to do a second study.67
As long as Commerce continues to follow its present policy of mak-
ing simple, cost-based adjustments, some assumption of pass-through
the statute, Commerce argued that ". . . the theoretical and modeling difficulties described above
demonstrate the inherently speculative and hypothetical nature of the results of the econometric
study." Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States (Apr. 14, 1987) (corrected determination on remand),
supra notes 18 and 54. For an excellent treatment of econometrics and econometric model building,
see R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS & ECONOMETRIC FORECASTS (2d ed.
1981).
65 The U.S. statute calls for both value-based adjustments and cost-based adjustments. In its
adjustment study, Commerce explained that it understood that value- (or economic-) based adjust-
ments would take into account the economic conditions in the market (le., supply and demand) to
measure the actual drop in price resulting from a one dollar rebate. Cost- (or accounting-) based
adjustments simply mean that a one dollar rebate drops the market price by one dollar. In an
attempt to reach an equalized, ex-factory, tax-inclusive price, Commerce strips out certain expenses
and equalizes others. Despite statutory language to the contrary, Commerce has adopted a cost-
based approach for all adjustments, particularly the COS tax adjustments, supra note 19, which
according to the statute should be based on value. See Antidumping Adjustment Methodology,
supra note 58; PATTISON, supra note 62.
66 Commerce has also argued that value-based adjustments rely on hypothetical prices, rather
than observed prices. "The Department is required by the statute to make its determinations on the
basis of verified information. Estimates of hypothetical prices are virtually impossible to measure in
any meaningful sense." Antidumping Adjustment Methodology, supra note 58, at 11.
This is one interpretation of the econometric approach, essentially requiring that each commis-
sion, rebate, etc., separately reflect the appropriate market conditions and therefore generate an
appropriate price drop. The resulting price-which will be used in a price to price comparison-was
not, in a strict accounting sense, observed. An alternative interpretation of the econometric ap-
proach uses observed prices and costs (expenses) and simply compares the ratio of net price to
demand elasticity between the two markets. See infra note 69.
67 See supra note 60.
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will be necessary. On purely theoretical grounds, an assumption of
100% pass-through is inconsistent with the existence of dumping. Alter-
natively, 0% pass-through is also unlikely. Therefore, Commerce's pres-
ent policy will prompt U.S. industries suffering from dumping to argue,
for example, that Commerce should "split the difference" and pass
through only 50% of the tax. To prevent such specious arguments,
Commerce should begin using econometric models in all of its cases.
The adoption of econometrics is difficult to justify on administrative
grounds if the models provide information on only one dumping adjust-
ment. Econometric models can, however, do much more. Not only can
they generate the percentage of tax pass-through, but they also can offer
a superior method of assessing injurious dumping. The administrative
determination of injurious dumping is currently a two-part process:
Commerce measures the extent of sales at less than fair value (or, more
colloquially, it calculates "dumping margins"), and the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") determines the degree of injury caused by
the sales at less than fair value.68 Econometrics will improve the admin-
istrative process, effectively integrating the functions of the two agencies.
Econometric models would measure sales at less than fair value by
simply comparing the ratio of net price69 to the elasticity of demand be-
tween the two markets. 70 A static econometric model-which measures
price discrimination over a single time period-needs information on the
supply (cost) and demand for the merchandise in the home market, and
data on the demand for the merchandise in the United States for the
period.7 1
Extending the static econometric model will rigorously identify the
68 See Comprehensive Issue Review, supra note 62.
69 Commerce's present policy is to calculate cost-based dumping margins on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. See Comprehensive Issue Review, supra note 62. An econometric approach
would build on Commerce's expertise in making cost-based adjustments to calculate net price. The
choice of which expenses to allow---e-g., advertising-and the appropriate method to model these
expenses within the conjectural variations framework would require careful examination.
70 Recall that price discrimination occurs when the ratio of price to marginal cost is different
between markets. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 681; NICHOLSON, supra note 4, at 350. Note that in
perfectly competitive markets, the ratio of price to marginal cost is 1:1. See supra note 51.
71 If Commerce wanted to use econometrics to analyze dumping in the Japanese television case
discussed supra, the existing econometric model, which was used to determine pass-through, would
need to incorporate data on U.S. demand for televisions. One could argue that this information
should have been collected and used in Commerce's pass-through calculation. In a sense, by mea-
suring pass-through only in the home market, Commerce did only half of the tax experiment. Be-
cause the elasticity in the United States is generally greater than the elasticity in the home market,
the tax pass-through in the United States will be less than the tax pass-through in the home market.
Commerce's econometric model therefore overestimated the amount of tax pass-through. In other
words, the second part of the experiment-modelling home market supply (assuming costs are the
same) and U.S. demand-would further decrease the amount of pass-through.
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sales at less than fair value that harm U.S. interests. Determinations
based on econometric models would replace current ITC injury determi-
nations, which tend to rely on qualitative measures-such as research
surveys of manufacturing firms-to measure the extent of injury to U.S.
industries.72 These dynamic models track the behavior of foreign manu-
facturers over several time periods by stringing together a series of static
models. The econometric approach recognizes that injurious price dis-
crimination (injurious dumping) is not simply setting different prices in
different markets. To maximize profits73 in segregated markets, firms set
prices depending on the elasticities in each market.7 4 In other words,
price differences may simply represent rational, profit-maximizing
behavior consistent with the economic conditions in each market.
Econometrics will identify when prices deviate from the profit-maximiz-
72 See Comprehensive Issue Review, supra note 62.
73 See supra note 50.
74 Elasticity is:
A measure of the percentage change in one variable brought about by a 1 percent change in
some other variable... This concept is most often used to describe how the quantity of a good
demanded responds to a change in its price. For example, if E.p = -2 [elasticity of quantity
with respect to price], a 1 percent rise in price causes quantity demanded to fall by 2 percent.
NiCHOLSON, supra note 4, at 680. The figure below demonstrates price discrimination consistent
with profit maximization--e. , marginal revenue ("MR") equal to marginal cost ("MC"). In this
example, the U.S. market has a larger elasticity of demand. Therefore, a rational, profit-maximizing
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ing position, generating an analysis consistent with an economic defini-
tion of injurious dumping.
A proper dumping analysis incorporates a sophisticated design
within a simple administrative process. First, the U.S. government
prescribes patterns consistent with injurious dumping. Second, dynamic
models are used to expose foreign producers' long-term pricing strate-
gies. If the behavior of a foreign manufacturer exhibits a prescribed pat-
tern consistent with injurious dumping, the U.S. government would
act.75 Econometric models would therefore differentiate harmful dump-
ing-e.g., predatory pricing in order to reap monopoly profits at a later
75 Dynamic models would track the behavior of foreign manufacturers over time. Several au-
thors have articulated schemes to classify dumping. Viner starts with a simple assumption: "There is
a sound economic case against dumping only when it is reasonable to suppose that it will result in
injury to domestic industry greater than the gain to consumers." VINER, supra note 2, at 23 (1921
ed.). Viner discusses a detailed scheme, classifying dumping as sporadic (non-injurious), intermit-
tent (injurious), and persistent (non-injurious). Id. at 23-44 (1966 ed.). Other economists have also
put together comprehensive classification schemes. Haberler, for example, states that "[d]umping is
harmful only when it occurs in spasms and each spasm lasts long enough to bring about a shifting
production in the importing country which must be reversed when the cheap imports cease." G.
HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 314 (1968). See also E. TAUSSIG, SOME
ASPECTS OF THE TARIFF QUESTION (1924); A. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (5th
ed. 1973). For a summary of these positions, see Ehrenhaft, supra note 2.
In contrast, Bork agrees that harmful price discrimination can be identified, but he disagrees
that it can be effectively remedied, stating:
That there now exist no reliable means, and certainly no means suitable for use in litigation, to
identify price discrimination is in itself a conclusive argument against adopting a law dealing
with the practice. Robinson-Patman's tendency to equate price differentials with price discrimi-
nation is, as we have seen, wholly erroneous .... If discrimination could be identified and
measured accurately, the law would then face the necessity of predicting whether a ban on the
practice would increase or decrease output. Accurate estimation is impossible, however, be-
cause it requires empirical data concerning the demand schedule of the customers. Nobody will
have that data.... The prospects of... predict[ing] ... discrimination are therefore bleak, to
say the least.
BORK, supra note 54, at 382-400.
Others would disagree with Bork. Approximately thirty years ago-before Commerce rou-
tinely collected the type of cost information required for econometric models-Peter Ehrenhaft
tracked a debate among noted economists on what type of information was needed to appropriately
identify injurious dumping.
However, Kindleberger too must admit that it is often difficult to distinguish between predatory
and persistent dumping, particularly as the difference does not become apparent until some time
has elapsed, during which domestic producers may have suffered irreparable harm. Viner an-
swers this argument with the assertion that since average and marginal costs of dumped goods
can be ascertained quite readily, the importing country can also judge whether or not the cheap
price of a particular commodity is due to abnormal and predatory, rather than usual and eco-
nomic reasons. According to this view, only those goods sold for export below marginal cost of
production are really suspect and should be made the subject of antidumping duties. However,
ascertaining foreign costs of production creates very serious problems. Although the existing
Antidumping Act has provisions for determining whether or not dumping is taking place by
relating the export price of goods to their cost of production, the recent report by the Secretary
of the Treasury asserts that this method presents such difficulties that its use "is generally war-
ranted only as a last result." [Citations omitted].
Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 48 n.21.
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date-from harmless (or helpful) dumping-e.g., liquidating excess in-
ventories during a temporary cyclical downturn. A more objective as-
sessment of injury would also give the U.S. government an opportunity
to augment its current injury criteria to include the interests of U.S. con-
sumers and downstream industries.7 6
Econometrics will, at first, introduce new complexities to the admin-
istrative process.77 The U.S. government will overcome these difficulties
relatively quickly, and its increasing expertise will allow for rigorous dif-
ferentiation between harmful and harmless (or helpful) dumping.7 8
Econometric models will promote a rapid response to legitimate an-
tidumping complaints, allowing the U.S. government to "separate the
wheat from the chaff" and focus on the cases that harm U.S; interests.
76 Downstream industries use the dumped product---e-g., semiconductors-to produce a final
good--e-g., personal computers.
77 Assuming that the econometric method is administratively feasible, then the modelling tools
and assumptions employed in each antidumping case will, of course, be subject to debate. In corre-
spondence with this author, one noted economist, Dr. Sydney Weintraub, stated that the
econometric modelling of pass-through "is a complicated economic issue, one on which competent
economists will disagree." Commerce and ITC decisions are, however, already subject to intense
debate within each agency, constant litigation by outside attorneys, and close scrutiny by the courts.
It is highly doubtful that attorneys and the courts would extend their current level of microscopic
examination into the realm of econometrics.
78 The U.S. antidumping statute would, of course, require substantial reinterpretation. The
econometric approach would likely need a substantial restructuring of the entire antidumping ad-
ministrative process. For example, after identifying legitimate complaints, negotiations and price
settlements could be used. As a last resort to stop predatory pricing-which the present antidump-
ing law cannot stop-an objective, econometric measure of injurious dumping could overcome the
stiff, statutory intent provisions of the little-used 1916 Antidumping Act, providing injured produ-
cers objective proof of an "intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States." Con-
gress enacted the 1916 law, making it criminal to import merchandise at prices "substantially less
than the actual market value." Ehrenhaft, supra note 2, at 45.
